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Algorithmic Justice: Dispute Resolution and the Robot 
Judge? 
 
John Morison and Adam Harkens 
School of Law, QUB 
 
Introduction 
 
The exponential growth of power in computing technology, combined with the 
development of big data, the internet of things and machine learning is 
transforming our world (Kelly and Hamm 2014; Greenfield 2017).   A 
burgeoning robotics industry is already making many humans redundant from 
a wide range of occupations, extending beyond those that are routine and 
repetitive and into a range of white collar jobs (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2014). While occupations that involve judgment and human interaction are 
likely to be among the last to be taken over by machines, a significant study of 
the impact of technology on 702 occupations found lawyers and judges to be 
more or less at the mid point of jobs likely to be replaced by technology (Frey 
and Osbourne 2013).  Software that can scan documents for key words and 
phrases has already transformed the role of paralegals and legal assistants.1 
It is certainly possible that the role of lawyers might be augmented by 
machines but could they, or even judges, be replaced by robots? In this 
contribution we consider the possibility of this and examine some of the 
issues that are raised.   
 
A focus on dispute resolution – rather than more formal hearings or trials – 
perhaps affords the strongest opportunity for the case to be made for 
technology. However we should declare an initial and strong skepticism that 
the essentially social nature of law can be reproduced by machines, no matter 
how sophisticated.  Nevertheless we will note the evolution of “Alternative 
Dispute Resolution” (ADR) into “Online Dispute Resolution”(ODR), and review 
briefly how the component tasks of mediation might be thought to lend 
themselves to technological enhancement.  We will be particularly alive to the 
issue of whether any of this technology has the potential to amount to a new 
system of dispute resolution as opposed to simply being a tool to augment 
existing processes. We will speculate as to whether the sort of patterns that 
might be gathered from big data and sorted by machine learning algorithms 
could provide the basis of a new approach, and what this might mean.   
 
ADR to ODR – The Promise of Digital Justice 
There is no doubting both the policy push for technology and the roll-out of 
various pioneering examples within dispute resolution in the UK and beyond.2 
                                                        
1 See for example The In-House Counsel’s LegalTech Buyer’s Guide 2017  (available at  
https://www.lawgeex.com/buyersguide/ ) which list over 100 “technology solutions” in what 
has been estimated to be a $16 billon market in the USA alone.    
2 For example, for the UK see: Lord Woolf, Access to Justice (1995, 1996), Lord Justice 
Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs (2010), Hazel Genn, Judging Civil Justice (2009), 
and Hodge, Jones & Allen, Innovation in Law Report 2014 (2014), Online Dispute Resolution 
for Low Value Civil Claims (2015), and for a critical voice see Transform Justice’s Briefing on 
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As stated in the Ministry of Justice’s Transforming our justice system report 
(2016, p.3), digitisation of proceedings is intended to play a major role in 
ensuring that the legal system of England and Wales provides “swift and 
certain justice”, in a manner that “[saves] people time and money, and 
[shrinks] the impact of legal proceedings on their lives.” Behind this goal is the 
belief that the current political culture of austerity lays the platform and 
provides the opportunity to transform and reconfigure how the courts and 
tribunal systems work in the UK (Marks, 2016; Donoghue 2017).  
In a context where the number of disputes is rising in a way not matched by 
the capacity of the formal system to provide effective access to justice, the 
promise of information and communication technology (ICT) is irresistible. The 
features of economy, accessibility, reach, speed and enhanced information 
management are valuable in the context of providing low cost dispute 
resolution. Of course new technology does not only promise solutions it also 
multiplies the number of disputes and their complexity as online trading 
across jurisdictions, internet shopping and the internet-enabled gig or sharing 
economy provides occasion for increased dispute.  Nevertheless as Katsh 
and Rabinovich-Einy (2017; 33-4) point out, some of the problem features of 
ICT – lack of face-to-face interaction, collection of all data, absence of privacy 
and reliance on the “intelligence” of the machine – can be beneficial in the 
context of ADR as where asynchronous communication allows time to consult 
and research, full data builds up a wider picture, decrease in privacy can 
assist in quality control and prevention strategies, and intelligence of the 
machine can enhance efficiency through automation of large numbers of 
small-scale disputes. Certainly there are many examples of simple and 
effective dispute resolution mechanisms utilising ICT (Wahab, Katsh and 
Rainey 2012; Civil Justice Council 2015; Duchateau et al 2016).  Providers 
such as The Mediation Room (http://themediationroom.com/) and Benoam 
(http://www.benoam.co.il/) have developed online platforms to allow mediators 
and arbitrators to exchange documents and communicate online.  Cybersettle 
and, more recently, TryToSettle.com, offer a blind bidding system where the 
parties to a dispute can attempt to find a match between offer and demand, 
while Smartsettle encourages parties to list their interests and assign them a 
value to allow a more complex spectrum of agreement to be attained.  In 
Germany and France, the government funded system Online Schlichter is 
used as an online mediation service for Business-to-Consumer e-commerce 
and direct selling disputes (see https://www.online-schlichter.de/vorzuege-der-
schlichtung/online-schlichter-an-odr-body-for-online-trading). eBay’s ODR 
system developed by SquareTrade is perhaps the most used format 
worldwide with more than sixty million disputes every year.  Online forms are 
used initially to make claims and demands, and an online mediation with 
human mediators is available if no early resolution is made.   (There is even 
an interesting crowdsourcing variation used by an eBay subsidiary in the 
Netherlands called Marketplaats which uses randomly selected volunteer 
jurors to adjudicate disputes.) 
                                                                                                                                                              
the Prisons and Courts Bill (2017). For the EU see: ADR Directive (Directive 2013/11/EU) and 
ODR Regulation (Regulation 524/2013) of 24th May 2013. For China see: Chinese judicial 
justice on the cloud: a future call or a Pandora’s box? An analysis of the ‘intelligent court 
system’ of China (2016) 
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ODR -  a tool or a system? 
 
While all of these examples are no doubt useful, the technology seems to act 
mainly as a tool to assist in dispute resolution rather than an autonomous 
system which can actually process, adjudicate or settle disputes 
independently.  Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy (2017) identify three major phases 
in the development of ODR whereby services have moved from simply putting 
the various elements of the dispute resolution triad on-line, through systems 
which deploy software to support and assist resolution, to the current (or 
indeed next) generation where the emphasis is on algorithms and smart 
machines using and re-using data to inform and underwrite systems that 
prevent disputes, or find easy ways to resolve them. This introduces an 
important distinction.  There are those ICT elements that contribute to dispute 
resolution in rather the same way as a complaints form, at the first level of 
evolution by simply making (a sometimes complex) account of the dispute 
available to be compiled and addressed by the parties online. At the next level 
not only is there software that may, for example, manage blind bids in an 
effort to reach settlement but also relative straightforward algorithms that may 
apply various rules in relation to multiple factors.  For example, in the context 
of an online shopping forum such as Amazon, if the buyer is a frequent 
purchaser or Amazon Prime member, an infrequent returner of goods, or if the 
goods are of low value or the subject of many complaints, then a particular 
outcome – a refund or replacement or whatever - may be produced by the 
algorithm without the intervention of any costly human resources.  This again 
is useful: it may improve the consumer experience and is certainly a more 
economically efficient business model than using human mediators in a 
telephone complaints department.  However it is not really replicating the work 
of a court, or even necessarily a mediator.  
 
At the third level data is collected in bulk quantities and examined and re-used  
by algorithms in a process of determining patterns. Again this may be 
valuable in ascertaining ways of avoiding disputes - keep the terms and 
conditions clear, provide a better description of the goods, offer a faster 
delivery service or whatever - but it does not amount to the sort of exercise in 
achieving third party agreement, with all the elements of discretion, appeal to 
authoritative determination or middle way arbitration that characterizes the 
classic triad of dispute resolution (Gulliver 1973; Shapiro 1986; Roberts and 
Palmer 2005).  Algorithms here are being used as an aid or tool within a wider 
process.  This is similar to the way in which algorithms are being used 
routinely, if not un-controversially, in the United States Justice system.  For 
example, in relation to bail applications President Obama’s Data-Driven 
Justice initiative commits 67 city, county, and state governments across the 
USA to using data-driven strategies to divert low-level offenders with mental 
illness out of the criminal justice system (White House 2016) while in terms of 
sentencing US Chief Justice Roberts created some controversy in an 
interview reported in the New York Times (Liptak 2017) which drew attention 
to a case in the Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissing an appeal against a 
sentence which was based on a prediction made by a private company’s 
proprietary software (see also Cristin et al 2015).  
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It is of course important to be careful to distinguish between the various 
elements of arbitration, negotiation, mediation and the various hybrid forms of 
ADR as well as straightforward adjudication (Roberts and Palmer 2005; Fuller 
1970; Mustill 1989; Fuller and Winston 1978). However if we parse out the 
various elements of dispute resolution it can be seen that most ICT enhanced 
processes are some way off replicating the human umpire.  A dispute will 
involve variations of the following steps:  identifying the issues, establishing 
“facts” – with varying degrees of evidential formality, ascertaining the relevant 
legal framework, providing an opportunity for venting feelings, evaluating the 
parties’ interests, disaggregating issues, establishing positions, exchanging 
information, suggesting options for resolution, setting out a time frame for 
actions, seeking agreement and creating binding resolutions. Routine civil 
disputes or consumer matters may sometimes be reducible to such steps.  
The high volume of cases in administrative tribunals too may capable of 
analysis into a number of steps and certainly the  Transforming our Justice 
System (2016) report mentioned above contains a vision for tribunals to 
include online hearings, traditional in-person hearings, and a mixture of the 
two. It envisages a new, simpler, procedure occurring online where lay users 
can be guided through the system in areas such as social security and child 
support (Tomlinson 2017). It is certainly possible that in areas such as these 
various stage in dispute can be assisted by ICT and the wider process 
augmented but this does not really amount to machines doing the dispute 
resolution?   
 
When we move to considering if the role of a court sensu stricto could be 
reproduced we find that there is, as Cranston points out, “an academic 
industry” considering what is involved here (Cranston 1986 n.2).  In its various 
branches this involves considering the adjudication and law-making aspects 
of a court and covers issues such as the use of discretion in decision-making, 
resolving hard cases and factoring in the role of morality and policy 
arguments. Cranston also describes the strand of legal anthropological writing 
that focuses on disputes and their resolution, and the work which 
distinguishes courts from mediation or arbitration by concentrating on the 
application of doctrine and the use of legal method. There is also the 
approach that sees courts as part of a wider political process, reinforcing 
allocations of wealth and power, restating the rights, rules, entitlements and 
obligations underpinning society, and supervising markets. Courts too are part 
of the wider constitutional landscape.  This may true not only in a general 
sense but as they operate in relation to individual cases. Summers (1974: 3) 
refers to “process values” within courts systems involving participatory 
governance, procedural rationality and humaneness.    In a recent landmark 
decision about the costs of justice the UK Supreme Court affirmed that actual 
and effective access to justice, and the procedure that the courts and tribunals 
provide, is not merely a public service like any other but a key part of the rule 
of law and the fabric of rights (R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51).  
 
Of course we must distinguish clearly between minor civil disputes, major 
cases and those with complex law or facts.  The various constituent elements 
or procedural requirements will vary in their formality as the stakes rise.  In 
more serious criminal cases the system is perhaps at its most complex with 
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strict rules of evidence and full opportunity to participate in the process. 
Indeed it is this element of participation in a decision that effects an individual 
– with all the rights that this engages - that is centrally characteristic to a 
formal legal dispute. In a series of cases considering the adequacy of 
government public consultation procedures the courts have looked at how 
different process elements drawn from court procedures – from a right to a 
hearing, to rights to know reasons for a decision, have time for consideration 
and response etc.  – relate to fairness, and indeed to wider issues of 
democracy and dignity (Morison 2017).  There is clearly much more to a court 
case than a simple dispute.  
 
Our position here is however much simpler.  We see the difficulty with 
reproducing the legal process by machines as arising from the essentially 
social nature of law.   In the same way as the early pioneers of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) took up law as a potentially fruitful area where they believed 
that they could model what they saw as straightforward “rules” into machine 
code, (Leith 1989) so there remains a view among many ICT enthusiasts 
today that law is about clear-cut rules applied to uncontroversial facts.3  This 
is of course not the case.  The actual practice of law is a highly social activity 
occurring within the complex milieu of legal practice where “facts” are 
negotiated among the parties, who must of course agree about what they are 
disagreeing about, before entering into the complex social interactions of the 
courtroom.  As one of us has argued in an empirical study drawing upon the 
legal realism of Jerome Frank there is a category of “legal information”, wider 
than simply law and fact (Morison and Leith 1992; Leith and Morison (2005).  
This is socially produced and acted on by dynamic processes within the wider 
legal system which are complex and contingent on a social context in ways 
that it is difficult to imagine ICT capturing.  This remains the case even with 
more specialist, upper court decisions where one might imagine that facts are 
more settled and the law more specialist (Morison 2012). 
 
All this suggests that while technology may be very useful in some 
circumstances, providing an enhanced form of customer service, it is some 
distance from taking over the role of courts.   However the well-known axiom 
of microprocessor development, enshrined as Moore’s law suggesting that 
computing power doubles every 18 months, presents a picture where radical 
development is possible.  As noted already, big data and machine learning 
are transforming the most unexpected areas of life. As Marshall McLuhan 
observed “when a new technology comes into a social milieu it cannot cease 
to permeate that milieu until every institution is saturated” (McLuhan 1964: 
223). Why should lawyers and courts be different? 
 
Big Data and ODR  
 
In order for algorithms to entirely permeate the present socio-legal milieu, 
machine learning would need to reach the point whereby a judge, or at least 
some form of surrogate judging system, could be produced either semi or fully 
                                                        
3 See, for example, the work of the International Association for Artificial Intelligence and Law 
at http://www.iaail.org (accessed 11th August  2017).  
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autonomously using big data analytics. This immediately conjures images of a 
robot judge dispensing justice within an artificially intelligent court, although 
judgment would just as likely be provided in something as simple as a 
computer screen (as in many ODR technologies).  
 
For example, the Traffic Penalty Tribunal (TPT) in England and Wales allows 
drivers to appeal tickets handed out by local authorities online.4 The idea 
behind this is that it follows what Shapiro (1981, p.1) refers to as the ideal 
prototype of courts, whereby an independent adjudicator applies the relevant 
law to the facts at hand, within adversarial proceedings, to produce a 
dichotomous decision that announces one party as being legally right, and 
one as legally wrong (without any need for legal representation in this case). 
Applicants must enter the relevant Penalty Charge Notice (PCN) number, 
then provide reasons for their appeal, before their case is evaluated by an 
adjudicator. The realities of how well this system fits such an analysis could 
be debated, but the crucial point is that it has allowed large numbers of 
relatively simple cases to be dealt with online, and has been deemed as a 
successful case of digitisation in the UK Courts by the judiciary (Briggs, 2016).  
 
While tools like the TPT allow drivers to appeal tickets through an online 
platform, the actual process of judgment or resolution is still carried out by a 
human actor who, ideally, neutrally assesses the evidence and arguments at 
hand, and fulfills the various steps of a dispute laid out above. A system of 
algorithmic dispute resolution, or robot judgment, would require something 
much more than this. The independent adjudicators would no longer be 
“lawyers with a minimum of five years’ legal experience”, 5 but sophisticated 
algorithms with machine learning capabilities, operating with a powerfully 
adaptive and “mindless agency” to produce both decisions and predictions 
(Hildebrandt, 2015). In such a situation, those five years of human experience 
could arguably be outstripped or rendered irrelevant by a robot judge, in much 
less time than it took a human to gather up.  
 
To create a system like this would require a complete instrumentalisation of 
the social aspect of law, as discussed above, into something that could be 
technologically calculated and predicted. Here, it would be an algorithmic 
actor identifying the issues and legal framework, establishing “facts”, 
evaluating the parties’ interests, disaggregating issues, establishing positions, 
exchanging information, suggesting options for resolution, setting out a time 
frame for actions, seeking agreement and creating binding resolutions. 
 
However, the current level of technological ability would suggest that such a 
situation is a long way off because reproducing the social aspect of law is no 
mean feat – not to mention the potential for judicial and political opposition, 
the threat from the powerful lobby that is the legal profession, and the dangers 
associated with opening up new opportunities for private sector technical 
developers who may come to dominate the market and unduly influence what 
should be a state function. For now at least, ICTs represent ‘disruptive 
                                                        
4 See: https://www.trafficpenaltytribunal.gov.uk/want-to-appeal/ (Accessed 4th August 2017) 
5 The requirement for office stated at https://www.trafficpenaltytribunal.gov.uk/our-
adjudicators/ (Accessed 4th August 2017) 
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technologies’, in that they may disrupt current working patterns and flows, but 
they cannot produce a new kind of justice system. As such they remain tools 
for current legal actors to augment their actions in specific tasks and 
processes. Indeed, a report by the Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group 
(2015) for the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary in the UK states that while they 
envision AI carrying out various tasks in the future, such as “legal diagnosis”, 
facilitation of negotiation without direct human involvement, and acting as 
“intelligent assistants” for judges, at no point is it proposed these same judges 
be replaced - meaning the final binding resolutions and decisions remain in 
human hands. Or at least it is to be hoped that this human control is 
maintained. In choosing this terminology and distinction between tool/system 
though, we do not mean to downplay or underestimate attempts to move 
towards such a system, or the transformative potential of these technologies 
for the law. Rather, we find them useful as a jumping off point for analysis of 
the new legal situation that we now find ourselves in. With that in mind, these 
issues can now be unpacked and explored further below.  
 
The Possibility of an ‘Intelligent Court’ 
 
It is now commonplace to hear that we are living in the middle of a “data 
deluge”, a “data tsunami”, or in the era of “data-ism” (Puschmann and 
Burgess, 2014; Lohr, 2015). Through digital technologies, social media, and 
the Internet of Things, data collection is presently both ubiquitous and 
pervasive, as online activity increasingly becomes a necessity for participation 
in 21st century society (Weber and Weber, 2010; Matzner, 2014).  We leave 
data trails wherever we go by shopping, browsing the web and interacting with 
the internet of things. A process of “datafication” is occurring whereby the data 
collected on people becomes a legitimate way to access, understand and 
control people (Mayer-Schoeberger and Cukier 2013; Van Dijck 2014). 
Without delving too deeply, as one of us has argued in a separate study, this 
environment has mainly been generated by a combination of the nature of 
digital technologies themselves - where data is often a by-product of their 
main function, such as HTTP cookies – quasi-legal instruments such as 
privacy policies, and economic incentives to put data to use such as for 
targeted marketing (Harkens, 2017). In other words, data production has 
come to be expected and is ‘normal’.  
 
To make sense of this vast array of newly available information, it is sorted 
into big data sets. Big data refers to collections of massive data sets so 
complex in variety, that traditional forms of analysis are insufficient. Instead 
algorithms are applied to carry out “bottom-up” learning through data-mining 
processes.6  These datasets are designed to be “exhaustive in scope” and, 
                                                        
6  We are using the term “algorithm” in this context to refer not only to a mathematical 
construct with ‘‘a finite, abstract, effective, compound control structure, imperatively given, 
accomplishing a given purpose under given provisions’’ (Hill 2015) but also to encompass a 
machine learning element, and the lay sense of the term which includes implementation of 
the mathematical construct into a technology, and an application of the technology configured 
for a particular task in a social context (Beer 2017). 
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through the deployment of algorithms, unique and far-reaching insights can be 
generated (Kitchin, 2014; Hildebrandt and Koops, 2010). Correlations can be 
used to predictively construct profiles about specific users or behaviours that 
will then inform future actions. At its simplest, for example, recommendation 
platforms allow companies like Amazon or eBay to suggest products to 
customers that they “might like”, based upon previous purchases or browsing 
history. Such techniques have been referred to by Antoinette Rouvroy (2012, 
p.143) as data-behaviourism, or new ways of “producing knowledge [about 
future events] without considering the subject’s psychological motivations, 
speeches or narratives, but rather relying on data.” But, what does this mean 
for the law and dispute resolution? Are there genuine prospects of building a 
legal system based upon this data, and what would this look like? 
 
Much can be, and has been, researched and discussed about the accuracy of 
the analysis involved in big data, privacy and data protection implications, 
issues with security, and state surveillance (Bellanova, 2016; Schneier, 2015). 
Notwithstanding these crucial subjects, for the purposes of this contribution, 
we would like to focus on the role of the judge, and specifically whether 
judicial reasoning – or the activity of judging - can be replicated by an 
algorithm, operating with machine learning capabilities. (To be clear, this is 
again distinct from the role of lawyers and legal assistants, where as we 
observed above, algorithms are having a significant effect on employment and 
working practices. There, increasingly, algorithms are used to digitally 
manage caseloads, collect and analyse huge amounts of documents during 
litigation discovery, predict the timing and outcomes of cases and negotiations 
- in order to manage billing and resources effectively - and also facilitate the 
digital presentation of evidence (Ashley 2017; Mills, 2016; Marciano 2017). 
Some of this may help judges too, but it is distinct from judging. 
 
Here we find that there has been an interesting research focus on outcome 
prediction as researchers attempt to determine in what direction a court might   
decide.  This is of course particularly interesting here as it connects most 
directly with dispute resolution and judging. Currently there are two categories 
of development: predictive tools for profiling individual behaviour; and 
predictive tools for profiling the behaviour of specific courts as a whole (and 
incidentally judicial reasoning within a given court). For any advocate, 
algorithmic analysis can help answer questions on the behaviour of a specific 
judge based on patterns of previous decisions (e.g. how they react to specific 
requests, or how they tend to structure negotiation), or it can assist with 
opposing counsel’s legal history. 7  In addition, services such as  Justice 
Toolbox can provides potential litigants in the U.S. with lists of available 
lawyers, sorted on win rate percentage and a personal quality review out of 
five stars.8 
 
This first set of technologies seem merely to be an acceleration of what 
lawyers have always done during adversarial negotiations, by sizing up 
                                                        
7 For a leading example, see LexMachina. Further Information available at: 
https://lexmachina.com/legal-analytics/ 
8 More information available at: https://www.justicetoolbox.com/ 
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opponents and judicial personality (Morison and Leith, 1992). While the 
results of data analysis may suggest certain strategies - and humans tend to 
defer to this algorithmic logic - there is no requirement to do so because these 
tools hold no decision-making power (Lyon, 2014; Zarsky, 2016). Whereas 
the other category of outcome prediction comprises something different; it 
represents a step towards encouraging algorithms to ‘think’ like judges, and 
therefore to predict judicial reasoning using machine learning. As a matter of 
policy, if the behaviour of a specific court could be accurately and predictively 
modelled by an algorithm, this same technology could potentially be 
designed-in and take over judicial decision-making powers in light of rising 
caseload issues, and in the interests of “effective management” - as a primary 
goal of courts in general (Leith and Hoey, 1998). This would be particularly 
powerful if combined with the data deluge of wider society, and its insights on 
disputants and legal subjects. Arguments often suggested in favour of this 
include the ‘neutrality’ of algorithms (in that some believe they avoid decisions 
based on politics or personality), efficiency, and the “immediate operationality” 
of big data analysis (Rouvroy, 2012).  
 
There are two prime examples of studies into the algorithmic prediction of 
court behavior. First there is the attempt by Aletras et al (2016)  to predict 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and secondly, 
there is work by Katz et al (2017) to predict decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court. The former’s model predicted 584 decisions with an average 
of 79% accuracy (as high as 84% for violations of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights), and the latter predicted 28,000 case outcomes 
with 70.2% accuracy, and 240,000 judicial votes with 71.9% accuracy. Both 
studies used the available databases of judgments for each court to construct 
their model, applying natural language processing and machine learning 
algorithms to text-based material. The sheer scale of cases involved 
demonstrates the significant computing power of big data that was previously 
unavailable with other forms of analysis. The study by Aletras et al, in 
particular, is useful because the algorithm used was significantly more 
accurate at predicting outcomes based on facts and procedure, than on the 
relevant law (and even better again when combined). Given that facts and 
procedure make up a large chunk of the social reality of a case, this is a 
significant development, particularly as such technology is only in its infancy. 
If accuracy levels were improved, the question could be asked: would be it 
more beneficial to have a ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ algorithm decide these 
cases? Despite this, it should be noted that since the ECtHR is an appeals 
court, the facts were not in dispute at this stage. It would no doubt be 
interesting to see how an algorithm would perform at the level of a lower 
court.  
 
For now though, as noted above, algorithms remain as intelligent assistants 
and tools. Were a machine learning algorithm, such as those employed by 
Aletras and Katz, to take over decision and rule making powers unsupervised, 
there is no guarantee that they would continue to follow the same patterns of 
prediction. In such a situation, the law could become increasingly uncertain 
and contestable, as algorithms developed new styles of reasoning, based on 
pattern recognition and language indecipherable by legal subjects and other 
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actors (Wilson, 2017).9 Indeed this contestability is already becoming an issue 
with current technology, as shown by the example mentioned above of the 
Loomis case in Wisconsin highlighted by the US Chief Justice, mainly 
because the logic and reasoning of the proprietary software used in the 
sentencing process is unavailable to the applicant, or any legal actor involved. 
Since this application has been denied, the opacity created by such a 
technological ‘black box’ has therefore been deemed acceptable in parts of 
U.S. law (Pasquale, 2015).10   
 
 
‘Datafication’, surveillance and judgment: dystopian futures? 
 
Although now we seem some distance from robot judges or algorithmic justice 
it is perhaps interesting to peer into a future where we might find the 
continuing technological revolution offering us possibilities that are presently 
difficult to imagine.   
 
For example, a radical version of the “datafication” process mentioned above, 
where almost all aspects of everyday life are transformed into quantified data 
and subject to monitoring and predictive analysis, provides the possibility of a 
wholly new system of surveillance and control.  In this situation, individuals 
are profiled and their behaviours modelled independently of any active input 
from them, as they become data subjects abstracted from their physical or 
real-world setting (Rouvery and Berns 2013).  These “data doubles” as they 
are termed by Hegarty and Ericson (2000, p. 613) are made up of pure 
information and they can be profiled, analysed and targeted for intervention. 
Indeed as Galič et al (2017) point out within their discussion of surveillance 
capitalism, these data doubles are more important than real bodies within this 
system where our data double, comprising a profile of our datafied component 
parts as determined by others, operates as a shadow self that stands in for 
our physical self and allows us to be subjected to predictive analysis, and 
therefore the control of an algorithmic governmentality. Machines are using 
algorithms to sort and manage the electronic traces that we leave behind us 
For Bauman and Lyon (2013) this has the result that many systems and 
processes are cut off from any consideration of morality or indeed human 
input. Data doubles are categorized in a process of “liquid surveillance” in 
ways that are seemingly more trustworthy than relying on a person’s own 
account of themselves or any system involving human judgment.  
 
Much of the thinking around this shadow world of data doubles who can be 
subject to seemingly neutral, machine-made inferences, has grown up in the 
context of either predicting consumer behaviour or developing systems of 
surveillance. However it is perhaps not too much of a stretch to imagine some 
sort of future online panopticon where our lives are lived out leaving digital 
                                                        
9 See the following for more information on the project referenced. Facebook have developed 
“dialog agents” capable of producing novel language and negotiating techniques, 
unsupervised.  https://code.facebook.com/posts/1686672014972296/deal-or-no-deal-training-
ai-bots-to-negotiate/ 
10 Case materials available at: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/loomis-v-
wisconsin/ 
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traces that provide an undeniable  and indelible record of our activities and 
actions, and can be subject to a surveillance  and a machine generated 
“judgment” on our conduct.  While this may remain the stuff of science fiction 
for now it does seem to appear as a logical terminus for some of approaches 
to surveillance that are developing.  
 
Conclusions 
 
There is much about technology that is destabilising of existing ways of living 
and it should be no surprise that even the operation of law in the courts is 
challenged by a technology that revolutionizes how we handle information.  
As Susskind has predicted “online courts and ODR will prove to be a 
disruptive technology that fundamentally challenges the work of traditional 
litigators and of judges.  In the long run I expect them to  become the 
dominant way to resolve all but the most complex and high-value disputes” 
(2017 p. 121).  We share this prediction in part, especially around settlement 
systems and dispute avoidance mechanisms: judges will increasingly adopt a 
“managerial stance” which will expand to encapsulate the umpiring of 
algorithmic functions in courts.   However we maintain reservations about 
some elements of technology in the context of judging.   In particular we feel it 
is important to resist the wilder claims about the coupling of the analytical 
capabilities of algorithms to the data deluge that we live in, and relying on 
machines to infer motivations and narratives through analysis of data patterns 
and correlations. It is perhaps heartening that the General Data Protection 
Regulation, which becomes effective in 2018 across the European Union, 
includes a right, subject to some exceptions,  “not to be subject to a decision 
based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces 
legal effects”.11  Based on the guidelines of the Article 29 Working Party 
(2017, p.8-9), a general prohibition will exist under the GDPR on decisions 
“based solely on automated processing”, or in other words, “with no human 
involvement”. Despite early worries that this wording opened a loophole 
whereby any nominal involvement of a human would be sufficient, as 
identified by Edwards and Veale (2017), the Article 29 Working Party (2017, 
p.9) have confirmed that ‘meaningful involvement’ beyond a ‘token gesture’ is 
required. In other words, the human in question must have the authority and 
competence to change the decision, meaning that it can be changed, at least 
hypothetically.   Law, perhaps above all forms of social interaction, must 
remain a site for struggle for essentially human values.  As Golder and 
Fitzpatrick (2009 p.79) argue, although the law is “inherently amenable to 
appropriation and instrumentalisation” by the logics of external powers (such 
as algorithmic prediction), law does maintain a social element that allows for 
resistance and contestation. The effect of this is that it is unlikely that we will 
ever see it converted into an automated algorithmic system.  
 
 
                                                        
11 See Article 22(1) of European Parliament (2016) Regulation (EU 2016/ on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) available at  
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5419-2016-INIT/en/pdf accessed 14th 
August 2017.  
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